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CONDOMINIUM: ITS ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS
JOHN W. WALBRAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the last several years, many states have enacted condominium
enabling legislation,' stimulated largely by the 1961 authorization of
FHA mortgage insurance for condominium housing.2 This legislation has
been described as "the first innovation that has come along in the real
estate field in a good many years .... "3
This article reviews the intended economic function and the social
purposes of the condominium concept and analyzes the present legislation.
II.

BACKGROUND

OF THE CONDOMINIUM

Rapid development in the law pertaining to housing in multi-family
undertakings on an occupant-ownership basis should not be surprising.
A housing shortage developed during World War II and rapid urbanization and an exploding population followed, rent control, which in
some places continued long after the war, made private investment
in rental housing less attractive than other opportunities.4 At the same
time, the disappearance of construction sites, generally increasing costs,
and increasingly prohibitive commuting distances, made the cost and
inconvenience of the traditional house and, lot so high that the housing
gap could not be closed.5 Nevertheless, the drive for individual home
*Associate, Thompson, Walther & Shewmaker, St. Louis, Missouri: LL.B.
cum laude 1964, Harvard University.
1. Citations of present condominium statutes appear in the Appendix.
Ed. note: Several of these statutes have been enacted since this article was
written and thencefore are not included in Mr. Walbran's discussion. Such statutes
are marked * in the Appendix.
1962).

2. National Housing Act § 234, 75 Stat. 160, 12 U.S.C. § 1715(y) (Supp.

3. Smith, Condominium in Pennsylvania, Prrr. L.J., Jan. 1964, p. 3.
4. Leyser, The Ownership of Flats-A Comparative Study, 7 INT. & COMP.

L.Q. 31, 32 (1958).

5. One significantly increased cost is the state and local real property tax.

See Haviland, Total Tax Collections in 1961, TAX POLICY, Oct. 1962, p. 2, at 8:
"Local tax collections from all sources except motor vehicle taxes increased in
1961. Property tax collections increased $1,572 million, or 10.0 per cent."
(531)
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ownership survived. These economic and social pressures provided the
impetus to search for a legal form incorporating the social and psychological advantages of individual ownership and the economic advantages of
apartment living7
Earlier efforts had produced the stock cooperative, which uses the
corporate form of organization. 8 The individual as a shareholder in the
corporation which itself holds title to the property is entitled to occupancy of an apartment under a proprietary lease.9
Each tenant-shareholder agrees to pay his proportionate share of the
mortgage indebtedness, real estate taxes, and other corporate expenses.
But the corporation's capacity to service its obligations depends on every
individual meeting his periodic assessments1 0 Thus the shareholders are
financially interdependent. The failure of one individual to pay his share
results in a default that must be cured by the others, if at all;" the
solvent cooperator must choose between losing his own apartment and
assuming the assessments of insolvent cooperators 1 2 This feature makes
the stock cooperative form objectionable.
In the depression of the thirties, the pyramiding of arrearages caused
a wave of defaults.13 Approximately 75 per cent of the cooperatives
6. Cribbet, Condominium-Home Ownership for Megalopolis? 61 Micr. L.
REv. 1207, 1208 (1963).
7. Kenin, Condominium: A Survey of Legal Problems and Proposed Legislation, 17 U. MIAMi L. Ray. 145, 148 (1962).
8. FHA, CONDOMINIUM HOUSING INSURANCE AND SERVICING HANDBOOK, App.
V-l, § 1.1 (1962).
9. Smith, supra note 3, at 5.
10. Comment, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative
542, 548 (1959).
Apartments, 68 YALE 'LJ.
11. Comment, Community Apartments: Condominiums or Stock Cooperatives? 50 CALIF. L. REv. 298, 300 (1962).
12. Comment, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative
Apartments, supra note 10, at 597.
The exact nature of the choice to which the solvent cooperator is put varies
with the liability defaulted by the corporation and the provisions of his proprietary
lease. Obviously, if the liability is secured by a lien prior to the lease, then the
corporation's default will cause the cooperator to lose his apartment. Otherwise,
it would be possible for the corporation to lose title to the building, with the cooperator retaining possession for the remainder of the term of his leasehold, if any.

Again, if the lease is literally proprietary, it would be terminated by the corporation's loss of the building, insolvency, and probable termination.
Furthermore, it may well be erroneous to assume that the cooperator could
look only to "natural economics" in determining whether or not to attempt to
protect his equity; it might be difficult for a man to turn his back on his home.
Id. at 599.
13. Ibid. Successive defaults resulting from financial interdependence are hereafter described as the stack-of-cards defect.
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failed; in contrast, the residential mortgage foreclosure rate infrequently
exceeded 20 per cent 1 4
Recent efforts have been devoted to the development of a legal form
permitting a more separate ownership of the units in a multi-family
dwelling.1" Ideally, a unit owner should be able to deal with his unit in
the same manner that a householder in the suburbs can deal with his
house and lot.-e Such individual treatment would eliminate the stack-ofcards defect of the stock cooperative. On the other hand, the owner's freedom must be conditioned in order to preserve the economy of multifamily living and to allow the reasonable regulation requisite to group
living.
There were at least two clear avenues along which this more separate ownership could be developed. "On the one hand, we know that in
the Middle Ages ownership of floors of houses, and even rooms, on the land
of different persons was common in various parts of Europe.' 7 That is,
several persons owned discrete parts of a single building.
The other approach is suggested by Coke on Littleton:
There are exceptions to the general rule that the land includes
everything above and below the surface. Thus a man may have
an inkeritance in an upper chamber, though the lower buildings
and the soil be in another, and it will pass by livery. (Emphasis

added.)'

s

The concept was one of aerial subdivision, the creation of estates in
airspace. Under the common law it was clear that airspace was owned
14. Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?,
supra note 11 at 324.
15. Comment, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative
Apartments, supra note 10, at 605, proposed FHA cooperative assessment insurance
as an antidote to the stack-of-cards defect. It should be noted that, in contrast to
condominium mortgage insurance, this would certainly require continuing FHA
participation in every insured cooperative as well as continuing FHA liability.
16. Smith, supra note 3, at 4.
17. Leyser, supra note 4, at 33.
At 35, Leyser observes that the CoDE NAPOLEO , art. 664 (1804), "treated
this type of ownership in line with established customary law, as a special kind
of co-ownership of an immovable." But it remained for later French legislation
in 1938, 1939 and 1943 to provide definitive treatment of the rights and obligations of the owners of flats.
18. COKE, COKE oN LrrrLEToN, § 48b (1628), quoted in Comment, The Crea-.
rion of Estates in Airspace, 25 RocKY MT. L. REv. 354, 355 (1953).
BucKLANrD & McNAIR, RoMAN LAw AND CoamioN LAW 78 (1936) state:
"[T]he thing exists in various places, notably on the south side of New Square,
Lincoln's Inn."
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by the individual holding title to the underlying soil. In a legal system
that early recognized the severance of estates beneath the soil, the severance of estates above the soil was a logical development. 9
Both approaches, without more, presented difficulties in the maintenance and government of buildings. Widespread utilization of separate
20
ownership techniques awaited structuring legislation.
In most of the new statutes, it is not possible to determine along
which of these paths the condominium concept has evolved. Most, as
the widely followed FHA Model Statute for Creation of Apartment
Ownership, attempt, without further elucidation, to provide specifically
21
for all contingencies in which the underlying theory might be relevant.
For example, assume that a building submitted to a condominium act
is destroyed. If the interest owned by the occupant were an interest in the
building alone, then upon its destruction, it might well be contended
that there was no interest left-other than an insurance claim, if any,
and an interest in the ground, if any. On the other hand, destruction
of a building should have no effect on an estate in air space. Because
neither result is entirely acceptable, because it seems there should be
a continuing interest and that a mechanism for rebuilding should be provided ahead of time, and because it seems undesirable to allow a hodgepodge of aerial estates to survive their usefulness, most acts provide
specifically for the destruction contingency. Thus, the Model Statute
provides in Section 26 that the Association of Apartment Owners shall
determine whether or not to rebuild, and that, if the determination is
not to rebuild, the remaining property "shall be deemed to be owned
22
in common by the apartment owners.11
It is difficult to generalize about the property interest which the
condominium purchaser acquires. First, a semantic difficulty is created
by the fact that slightly less than half of the acts authorize the submission of leased land or a leased building, or both, to a condominium
act, with the consequence that the relevant portion of each condominium
19. Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?,
.rupra note 11, at 302-03.
20. Leyser, supra note 4, at 33 comments: "It appears that excessive splitting
up of the ownership of houses in this way, as well as the lack of clear rules covering the repair and maintenance of the building were [sic] the cause of the many
disputes."

21. FHA, MODEL STATUTE FOR CREATION
[hereinafter cited as FHA MODEL STATUTE].
22. FHA MODEL STATUTE § 26.
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unit is truly leased. 28 Probably the easiest evasive tactic here is that
taken by several of the acts: regardless of the nature of the property
interest submitted to the condominium act, the condominium purchaser
is said to own his unit.24 Beyond this, there is the generally unresolved
issue, set forth previously, of whether the condominium apartment is both
an interest in a building and an aerial estate, or exclusively one or the other.
Nevertheless, there are several constants which can be regarded as
the definitional qualities of the owned condominium unit. The unit
consists of two elements which are inseparable for the duration of the
condominium project. The first element is the apartment. "'Apartment'
means a part of the property intended for . . . independent use, including one or more rooms or enclosed spaces . . . in a building .... -25 The
second element is an undivided interest, an interest in common with
other unit owners, in the common areas and facilities of the condominium project. These include the land, the supporting structures, installations for central services, and such other community facilities as
are provided. 26 The percentage of the undivided interest included in
each unit is specified in the declaration, which is the document by
which property is submitted to the act. The percentage is sometimes
based on the relative values of the apartments and sometimes set by
the developer's arbitrary stipulation. It may or may not be subject to
change, but is usually amendable by agreement among all the unit owners.
The provisions in the several condominium acts for the maintenance
and government of the project are for the most part beyond the scope
of this article. As observed above, however, these are necessary provisions,
and a brief outline of the devices employed will be useful later in the
economic analysis of the condominium.
Regulation of the project, supplementing specific statutory requirements, is achieved with two basic devices: covenants and by-laws. The
former are set forth either in the recorded declaration or in the deed
of the individual unit; the latter are usually set forth initially in the
23. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.32.010(2), .030 (Supp. 1964), which
authorizes the submission to a condominium project of land and buildings owned,
leased or possessed . . ." in any manner permitted by state law.
24. E.g., Tax. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a § 2(d) (Supp. 1964): "'Condominium' means the separate ownership of single units . . . in a multiple unit
structure .. .with common elements." (Emphasis added.); § 1(1) includes in
general common elements the land, whether leased or in fee simple.
25. FHA MODEL STATUTE § 2(a).
26. Id. at § 2(f).
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declaration, subject to amendment by the association of apartment
owners. Most covenants will be typical restrictive covenants. One exception is notable: positive covenants-that is, covenants to do as opposed to covenants to refrain from doing-are almost always either explicitly or implicitly authorized. Probably the best example is the covenant to pay assessments for the common expenses involved in maintenance and common services, where this payment is not required by statute 2
The organization of the owners' association is included in the by-laws.
The association is usually authorized by statute to hire a professional
manager.
At this point, two facts should be clear: first, that the conceptual
structure of the condominium unit permits a far more separate form
of ownership than the stock cooperative; and second, that the condominium legislation provides a mechanism that rivals the cooperative corporation in efficiency and surpasses it in owner participation. It remains to
lie seen whether or not the condominium unit can approach more closely
than the cooperative the economic independence of the single family
dwelling.
III. SEPARATE FiNANCING
A. Opportunity for Unit Economnic Independence

The standard against which the economic independence of the condominium unit must be tested is the single family dwelling. Conversely,
private-house thinking provides the guidelines for the realization of the
fullest possible unit individuality.
"Two of the most attractive features which condominium seems to
offer the unit buyer involve separate taxation and separate financing of

each ownership." 28 Mortgage indebtedness is likely to be the largest
single liability of the project, and of most of the individual owners as
well.20 As a result, the most important single step condominium legislation
27. While few of the other acts are as specific in this regard as California, it
seems likely that the judicial enforcement will be subject to some sort of reasonableness test. California achieves this result with the statutory provision that
the restrictions are "enforceable equitable servitudes where reasonable." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1355.
28. MacEllvan & Eagen, Condominium--A Symposium, 41 TITLE NEWS 38
(Dec. 1962).
29. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COL'uM. L.
Rnv. 987, 1019 (1963), recognizes that debt service is the largest single expense
of the newly constructed cooperative, followed by real property taxes (with which
he is primarily concerned at this point). There is no basis for anticipating a different experience with the condominium.
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can take to assure unit independence-and therefore owner security3 0-is to
provide for separate unit financing3 1Implementation of separate financing is not difficult. The condominium unit should be declared to be real propertya 2 A brief statement
should follow this declaration of status indicating the intent to give to
the unit owner the rights and obligations of every real property owner
except as those rights and obligations are modified by the condominium
legislation itself. The rights can be further defined to include the right
to convey, to mortgage, and to lease the unit.s"
Separate financing is not free. "Adequate servicing of these loans will
be relatively high in cost

. . . ,"

perhaps, more expensive than servicing

the single family dwelling, and certainly more expensive than servicing
the cooperative. s4 For instance, appraisal of the condominium unit will
certainly be more complex than appraisal of a single house; and the sheer
multiplicity of borrowers will raise condominium financing costs above
those of the cooperative. In addition, from the bank's point of view,
there are new risks in the condominium loan. "Among the foremost of
these risks . . . will be the quality of . . . [owner] . . . management." 85

And, if a mortgage must be foreclosed, the lender will not be able to
board up the unit and eliminate most of the maintenance costs, as he
could with a single family house. The common expenses of the condominium project will continue.8a Finally, as compared with the cooperative,
there is no collective responsibility. After a certain number of individual
defaults, the default rate within the cooperative is inevitably accelerated;
thus the lender also may profit from the added stability of the condominium
project as a whole. At any rate, separate financing as opposed to cooperative
financing seems to be worth the extra servicing and appraisal costs-an
interest rate approximating that on loans on individual houses."
30. It should be noted that this owner security is accompanied by an ap-

parent increase in owner responsibility, but this increase is apparent only. Even in
the stock cooperative the owner was liable, although there to the corporation,
for his share of the housing expenses. The owner's failure to discharge this obligation resulted in loss of ownership and apartment. Thus, from the individual owner's
outlook, the cooperative operated collectively only on the "down side."
31. Comment, Commuznity Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?
supra note 11, at 328 (1962).
32. Cf. FHA MoDEL STATUTE § 4.
33. Cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1004 (Supp. 1963).
34. O'Keefe, FinancialAspects of the Condominium, 30 APvaPusAL J. 465, 469
(1962).
35. Id. at 468.
36. Ibid.
37. 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.20, 234.29 (1965) specify the same maximum interest
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While not bearing directly on owner security, the financing flexibility
permitted by condominium separate financing should be noted. "[T]he
individual can pay cash for his unit, obtain a conventional loan or an
FHA insured loan." 38 This is different from the cooperative purchaser's
situation, where a mortgage loan is not possible because stock and not
real estate is being purchased. "[I]nstitutional lenders do not like to
finance the purchase of stock and some are strictly regulated on stock
loans." 0 Finally, since no stock is to be sold, the condominium project
should not be subject to SEC or state "Blue Sky" law regulation. The
financing possibilities presented by the condominium concept have been
described as "Utopian.1 40 They are certainly desirable.
This treatment of the separate financing feature of the condominium
unit assumes that a solution is found to the problem presented by any
existing blanket mortgages and liens affecting the entire project. Three
alternatives are available. First, the existing lien could be allowed to
remain effective against the entire project. This approach is undesirable.
If it does not render the condominium units unmarketable or grossly
hinder the financing of their purchase, it certainly subjects the unit purchaser to an unwise dependency on the solvency and reliability of his
seller. Second, the existing lien could be apportioned among the several
units in the same percentages as the ownership of the common elements,
but otherwise remain unaffected. Thus, the purchaser's possible loss would
be limited, but his ultimate dependence on the solvency and reliability
of his seller to the extent of the proportionate share of the existing lien
would remain. This, as the prior solution, could be a trap for the unwary
purchaser. This solution also gives to an initially financing bank an undue
economic advantage over its competitors. It virtually guarantees that
every informed buyer will insist on a purchase agreement to which the
lending agency is a party and in which a novation is effected. (The
individual unit would be removed from the blanket lien. The purchaser
would assume direct liability for his portion of the debt secured by the
rate of 5 % for insured loans on single family dwellings and on condominium units.
Current construction signifies market acceptance of this treatment in parity.
38. FHA, CONDOMINIUM HOUSING INSURANCE AND SERVICING HANDBOOK, App.

V-1, § 1.1 (1962).

39. Smith, supra note 3, at 6.

T:x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, § 10 (Supp. 1964), specifically makes
loans on condominium units eligible investments for state lending institutions.
40. Vogel, A New Look in Loans, the Condominium, 22 MORTGAGE BANKER
26, 26 (1961).
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blanket lien.) Another factor would be the buyer's probable inability to
find another lending agency interested in lending on what would effectively
be a second mortgage. Inevitably, the initial lending agency is placed
in a position to secure the financing business in the transaction, if any,
of the purchaser. Conceivably it could insist on acquiring this business as
a condition of the novation.
A better solution is one that may have been adopted by the FHA
Model Statute, although in large part sub silentio. Section 14 of the statute
provides:
At the time of the first conveyance of each apartment, every
mortgage and other lien affecting such apartment, including the
percentage of undivided interest of the apartment in the common
areas and facilities, shall be paid and satisfied of record, or the
apartment being conveyed and its percentage of undivided interest
in the common areas and facilities shall be released therefrom by
partial release recorded. (Emphasis added.)
This section obligates the seller either to pay any existing lien against
a unit sold or to obtain a release of the unit. This duty could certainly
be enforced against a solvent seller.
The section also can, and should, be read to create a duty on the
part of pre-sale lienors to release each unit as it is conveyed. This interpretation of the statute would insure the marketability of the condominium unit,
in terms of both buyer and lender acceptance. It would remove the trap for
the unwary purchaser that is concealed in the other alternatives, and make
possible competition for the financing of condominium sales.41 This interpretation would, however, require pre-sale lienors to protect themselves both
contractually and by such policing of the sales of the condominium units as
they deem necessary-knowing the borrower and his economic situation.
B. Present Legislation
The new legislation does make separate financing available to the
unit purchaser. Most statutes, following the FHA Model Statute, begin
41. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-308, which is designed to achieve the
same effect, where it is applicable, as the provision contemplated in the text. It
enables a secondary financer, for instance a local bank, to compete with an inventory financer such as, for example, in the automobile business, the General Motors
Acceptance Corporation, for the financing of the ultimate sale at retail. The primary
or inventory financer is protected by a security interest in the proceeds of the sale
which arises at the same time that the secondary financer acquires a security interest in the chattel.
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with a declaration to the effect that "each apartment, together with its undivided interest in the common areas and facilities, shall for all purposes
constitute real property." (Emphasis added.) 42 The Arkansas statute provides that each unit shall be treated "as if it were sole and entirely
independent . . . . '4 Others express this general declaration of status,
specifically authorizing the owner to deal with his unit in certain ways,
usually including the right to convey, to mortgage, and to lease it. Even
without specific mention, however, there is no mistaking the intent
to effect separate financing. Probably the strongest internal implication
of this intention can be found in the liens provisions. For example, the FHA
Model Statute provides that, while property is subject to the act,
During such period liens or encumbrances shall arise or be created
only agfiinst each ... [unit] . . . , in the same manner and under
the same conditions in every respect as liens or encumbrances
may arise or be created upon or against any other separate parcel
of real property subject to individual ownership . . . .
Finally, the available legislative history reflected primarily in law review
articles, clearly indicates an intent to authorize and facilitate separate
financing.45
Nevertheless, not one of the present statutes adequately insures the
removal of blanket mortgages and liens covering the project at the time
of the first conveyance of the condominium units. Most, again following
the FHA Model Statute, declare that liens insofar as they affect any
unit shall be paid or released at the time of its first conveyance.4 None,
however, indicates the consequences of non-compliance. Wisconsin is
the most definite, requiring that blanket mortgages include a proviso for
a "sum certain" payment to release a unit.47 By implication, it would
seem that a unit purchaser could clear his unit by tendering this sum
directly to the lender and by refusing to purchase from the developer
except as this tender is accepted and taken into consideration in determining the purchase price. Obviously, this procedure requires owner anticipation; however, the statute affords the owner no insurance of the developer's
42. FHA MODEL STATUTE § 4.
43. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1001 (Supp. 1963).
44. FHA MODEL STATUTE § 9.
45. E.g., Cribbet, Condominivmz--Home Ownership for Megalopolis?, 61

MicH. L. REv. 1207 (1963), written following the author's involvement in the
drafting of the Ohio Condominium Property Act.
46. E.g., FHA MODEL STATUTE § 14.
47. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.83 (Supp. 1965).
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integrity or solvency where the owner purchases before his unit is released
by the lienor. Amendment is necessary.

IV. SEPARATE TAXATION

A. Opportunity for Unit Economic Independence
The second most important feature of the condominium concept
from the standpoint of unit economic independence and owner security
is the opportunity that it presents for separate taxation. Drawing on
cooperative information, the following statement succinctly displays the
significance of this opportunity:
A real estate tax lien blanketing the entire project greatly increases the unit owner's risk of financial interdependence, since
in unsubsidized, multi-family projects, the local property tax may
reach fifty per cent of the operating budget excluding debt serv48
ice. (Emphasis added.)
With separate financing, this means that provision for separate taxation may reduce the remaining owner interdependence as much as 50
per cent.49
The adoption of FHA Regulation 234.26(d) adds further importance
to the separate taxation of condominium units. It requires, as a prerequisite to mortgage insurance, that the mortgagee certify that "the
family unit is assessed and subject to assessment for taxes pertaining
only to that unit."50 While the propriety of this regulation can hardly
be questioned in the light of the preceding data and the owner security
it is calculated to effect, the regulation appears to have been erroneously
derived. The FHA Condominium Housing Insurance and Servicing Handbook reasons:
48. Berger, supra note 29, at 1019.
At n.19 3, Berger supports his argument with the following information: "See,
e.g., Central Park Towers Co-op, Inc. (New York City), Offering Plan, March 1963,
pp. 11-12 (est. at 54.9%); 297 East 79th Apartment Coop (New York City),
Offering Plan, March 1963, p. 31 (est. at 50.3%)."
49. Cf. Schlitt, History of Condominiums, 30 APPRAISAL J. 453, 456 (1962):
"We hope that under the new condominium statutes there will be a direction to the
taxing authorities to tax each individual ownership as a separate parcel, so that the
default in taxes by one owner will not be a burden on the others in the same
building." Schlitt is Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel of the Home Title
Guaranty Company of New York City.
50. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(d) (3) (1965).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Real estate taxes must be assessed and be lienable only against
the individual units. .

.

. [0]therwise a tax lien could amount to

more than the value of any particular unit in the structure and
thus present a situation which would be unsatisfactory from the
mortgaging standpoint.".
Indeed, it would be most unsatisfactory to either the mortgagee or
mortgagor if, when taxes were assessed and liened against the whole
project, any one or more units within the project could be sold arbitrarily to satisfy the lien. But that would be a most unusual-and, until
now, unheard of-result. Taxes assessed against the whole project would
certainly be common expenses of the project and assessable to the several owners by the owners' association or its project manager. Failure
to pay this assessment could result in a lien on the defaulting owner's
unit 1, But this is a situation that, while not an appealing one to the
non-defaulting owners (whose common expense burden will be increased
to the extent that the default is not cured or the debt realized on a
foreclosure sale), is perfectly analogous to that generally existing in the
cooperative. Banks do lend to cooperatives and the FHA does insure
53
these loans.
The power to tax units separately is generally available. The "power
of a state to impose taxes is closely analogous to the general power of
" "Local political subdivisions
taxation possessed by any sovereign. . . ...
5
* . . , unlike the state itself, have no inherent power of taxation." 5 In

the absence of a special and unusual home rule provision in the state
constitution, the local power to tax derives from statutory delegation.5
"State legislatures, having power . . . to delegate the taxing power for

local purposes to the authorities of local government, have the power
to prescribe the limits to any tax they impose directly."51
Most jurisdictions do not require the assessors to tax the different estates
and interests that may exist in a single parcel of land to the respective
51. FHA, CONDOMINIUM
V-1, § 1.8 (1962).

HOUSING INSURANCE AND SERVICING HANDBOOK,

App.

MODEL STATUTE §§ 2(g), 23(a).
53. See 52 Stat. 23, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1715b, 1715e (1958).
Pike, The Condominium as a Mortgage Investment, 14 HASTINGS LJ. 282
(1963), falls into the same trap in his reasoning at 287.
54. 51 AM. JuR. Taxation § 53 (1944).
55. Id. at § 64.

52. See text, infra at 27; Cf. FHA

56. See

WORLD TAx

SERIEs,

TAXATION IN THE UNrrED STATES 163

(1963):

"local tax ordinances are controlled nearly everywhere by state law."
57. 51 AM. JUR. Taxation § 133 (1944).
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owners.58 A "practice of assessing the entire property as a unit to the
owner of the remainder . . ." has developed. 5 In many states, case law

has hardened this practice into a rule variable only by statute0 0 Single
purpose exceptions to the rule have been enacted with apparently increasing frequency,"1 but "the dominant theme of the real property tax
statutes remains unitary assessment .... 1,,12
Statutory regulation begins in most states with the proposition that
real propery shall be taxed to its owner.0 3 The next step is a definition of
real property. Some thirteen states use the following wording: "'Real
Property' includes the land itself

. . .

and all land or privileges belonging

or appurtaining thereto."" "[Tihese statutes are broad enough to justify
virtually any action taken by an assessor." 5 Thus, it is conceivable
that there could be separate taxation of condominium units without
specific legislation, for the unit purchaser is an owner 8 and the condominium unit is, at least, a privilege appurtaining to land. Thus the
Attorney General of California has ruled that a California assessor may,
but is not required to, assess condominium units separately 0 7 But even
if he did, he probably would not be estopped to change his position
or be able to bind his successor.
While a developer might build a condominium project under these
circumstances, and while purchasers could work out the allocation of
the tax burden by contract, it seems most unlikely that the FHA would
insure any mortgage. If separate taxation is as right as the analysis
above would seem to indicate, the FHA has taken the correct position.
There should be legislation compelling separate assessment and liening
of condominium units.
Probably the best argument against the quick acceptance of sep58. Id. at § 689.
59. Keesling, Property Taxation of Leases and Other Limited Interests, 47
CALIF. L. Rrv. 470, 476 (1959).
60. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 404(a) (1954). E.g., Gowan v. Swain, 90 N.H. 383,
10 A.2d 249 (1939). Toothman v. Courtney, 62 W.Va. 167, 58 S.E. 915 (1907), is a
classic case in this area.
61. See generally WoRLD TAX SERins, op. cit. supra note 58, at 168-69;
Nichols, Real Property Taxation of Divided Interests in Land, 11 KAN. L. REv.
309, 311-20 (1963).
62. Nichols, sipra note 63, at 309.
63. Id. at 310.

64. Id. at 310 and n.8.

65. Id. at 311.
66. See text, supra at 4.
67. 37 CAL. Ors. Ar'ey. GEaN. 223, 228-29 (1961).
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arate taxation for condominium units is the general need for reform.
For the most part, parcel assessment operates with reasonable fairness.6
There are, however, instances where the practice may result in
substantial inequities. Generally speaking, such instances arise
where the value of the remainder interest is relatively small in
proportion to the total value of the property and the owner of
such interest has no opportunity to work out an arrangement
with the owner of the possessory interest ...

[or interests] ... for

the payment of a portion or all of the taxes.0 9
In addition, there is a real need for a "taxing system which treats
more equitably the holders of divided interests . . ." generally.70 The
present pattern is largely without reason; many of these interests are
separately taxed, but others are not.7 1
Historical development is partly to blame for the resulting discrimination. For instance, it was probably easier for a common law
court to require the separate taxation of the mineral estate than of any
other, since the analogy between an underground and a surface parcel
is easily drawn. Furthermore, the imposition of a large tax on the owner
of a valueless surface estate overlying a rich mineral estate responsible
for the size of the tax tended to emphasize the need for separate taxation
as well as to produce, on occasion, substantial inequity when the surface
owner was unable to obtain contribution from the owner of the mineral
estate. But in larger part this pattern probably reflects past political efforts
by owners of property interests susceptible of organization to obtain certain,
convenient, and individual tax treatment.7 2 While undue advantage has
probably not been taken in this area, it is now timely to extend the
convenience and certainty of separate taxation to equally deserving divided
interests in real property.73
The classic argument against separate taxation can be briefly put:
68. See Keesling, supra note 61, at 476.
69. Id. at 477.
70. Nichols, supra note 63, at 321.

71. See generally Nichols, supra note 63, at 311-20.
72. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATON 11 (1961), reminds the lawyer

that he must maintain a realistic attitude when he analyses tax law and its development: "Taxes . . . are a changing product of the earnest efforts to have
others pay them."
73. Nichols, supra note 63, at 321-22, sets out criteria for "split assessment."
The effort appears to have two purposes: First, to give uniform treatment to the
classic divided interests, e.g. the mineral estate and separately owned buildings

and improvements; and second, to extend this treatment to other substantial in-

terests, e.g., leases for a relatively long term.
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"The fee cannot be carved to the disadvantage of the municipality."7 4
Stated less cryptically, parcel assessment relieves taxing officials of the
necessity of ascertaining the existence of less-than-fee interests and valuing
and assessing them.75 Thus, any "carving" of the parcel can be said to
be the disadvantage of the taxing government.74
The general acceptance of this reasoning can best be seen as a reflection of the theory of the property tax itself. It is neither a spendings
nor an income nor an earnings tax.7 7 It is a popularly accepted and understood tax, easily predicted, and ordinarily a stable source of revenue
that has been relatively simple to administer.78 It seems fair to conclude
that simplicity is basic to the real property tax.
If separate taxation of condominium units can be achieved, either
as a part of a general reform or as another single purpose exception to
the parcel assessment rule, without unduly complicating the property
tax, then the security which separate taxation provides to unit owners
should be reason enough for its adoption. There is, however, an expectation that separate taxation and separate financing together could confer
added benefits on the taxing entity. "[I]t is believed, but not yet determinable, that the amenities of a condominium and the method of financing
produce a market value 10 to 15 per cent higher than the cooperative . ... "79 That is, there is an expectation that this kind of condominium would produce a substantially higher tax base than a comparable
cooperative, at least on a continuing basis, as original cost becomes over
time a less reliable basis for the determination of value. Moreover, if
the condominium avoids most of the stack-of-cards defect of the coop74. Becker v. Little Ferry, 126 N.J.L. 338, 19 A.2d 657, 659 (1941).
75. Keesling, supra note 61, at 476.
76. See Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 298, 326 (1962): "The justification for refusing separate
taxation .. .is that it would increase assessors' administrative burdens. More tax

bills would be necessary and difficult valuation problems would arise."
77. See GROVES, FINANCING GovERNmENT 43 (1954), "[Tlhe general property
tax is a tax on all wealth, tangible and intangible, which possesses exchange value.
It is levied according to exchange value, at least, in theory, and at a common ratio
for all property in the same district. It is thus a uniform and universal tax upon
the value of goods owned." The real property tax, although imposed on an obviously narrower subject, is thus fairly characterized.
78. MICtHIGAN TAX STUDY STAFF PAPERS 186 (1958):
"It has been frequently said that the property tax is more accurately viewed
as a part of the institution of government than as a mere source of revenue." Id.
at 185.
79. Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 1964, § A, p. 41, cols. 5-8, quoting Percy E. Wagner,
past president of the Appraisal Institute, an affiliate of the National Association
of Real Estate Boards.
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erative, as it should, this will be a more stable tax base.: Other benefits
can be imagined. It is possible that there will be less hesitancy to foreclose a lien imposed for tax delinquency where it will deprive only the
responsible individual of his housing. Possibly individual unit owners
8
will be less litigious than the corporate combination they replace.

While it might be ". . utterly impractical to require the separate
valuation of the various interests in property . . . in all cases . . . ;,12
properly conditioned, separate taxation of the condominium unit should
neither unduly burden the tax assessor nor impair actual tax collections.
The assessor would have no discovery problem in the separate taxation
of condominium units because ownership of the units will be a matter
of public record just as the title ownership of other real property. Even
the burden of record checking could be removed easily by placing a
duty on the project developer to notify the local assessor at the time
that property is submitted to the condominium act.8 3 Although the failure
to perform this duty conceivably could result in project taxation in the
first year of a condominium's existence, this reasonable condition should
not preclude FHA insurance. The FHA simply can require the developer
84
to notify the assessor before it insures any mortgage.
80. See text, infra at 27, where it is observed that the fact that there are common expenses arising from the operation of jointly used facilities does build a stackof-cards potential into the condominium project, although one of far less danger
than that built into the cooperative corporation.
81. Lippman, Legal Problems of Condominiums, 30 APPRAISAL J. 458, 461
(1962).
82. Keesling, supra note 61, at 478.
83. Both Nichols and Keesling, rejecting mandatory, across-the-board separate
taxation of divided interests in real property, would place the burden of establishing the right to separate taxation, including, of course, notification to the assessor,
on the presently taxed remainderman or title owner. Nichols, supra note 63, at 32122; Keesling, supra note 61, at 478.
Where the tax burden can be satisfactorily redistributed privately, there is no
need for the imposition of public procedures. On the other hand, except in those
cases where the divided interests arise from contractual arrangements, it is unlikely that private negotiations will be effective-except perhaps where the duty
of all owners to contribute to the payment of the tax is clearly established, and all
interests are substantial.
The requirement of affirmative action for separate taxation, really the requirement of an information return, should prevent the concealment of property interests in the division process.
84. When property is committed to a condominium act after the date on
which assessment for the tax year is made, a similar problem is presented. It is
submitted that the solution to the problem posed in the text as well as the problem posed here is to treat the resulting lien for non-payment as if it arose after
the commitment of the property to the condominium, and thus to allocate it proportionately to the several units, as soon as the procedural conditions have been
met.
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The satisfaction of two conditions should make separate taxation
entirely acceptable. First, separate taxation should be available only to
condominium projects to which property has been submitted either in
fee simple or under a long-term lease. There may be legitimate reasons
for authorizing, as California has done, the submission of property to a
condominium for as short a period as one year, 5 but the tax assessor
should not be required to undertake the massive readjustments of the
tax rolls that short term conversions of a substantial project would entail.
It is difficult to establish the minimum period to which separate
taxation should be accorded. On the one hand, it has been argued that
a reformed property tax system, taxing separately all substantial lessthan-fee interests, should accord separate treatment to all leases for
longer than a three year period 86 On the other hand, while such shortterm interests might be marketable, they would not be marketable in the
owned housing market at which the condominium was originally aimed.
A three year condominium is merely a lease substitute. Thus, the FHA,
in carrying out the mandate under Section 234 to increase "the supply
of privately owned dwelling units . . . ,,,s8
has provided by regulation that
"to be eligible, a leasehold interest shall be under a lease for not less
than 99 years which is renewable, or under a lease with a period of not
less than 50 years to run from the date the mortgage is executed." ss In
the absence of a general overhaul of the property tax, limiting separate
taxation to fifty year condominiums would seem to achieve the desired
encouragement to owned housing while avoiding an unreasoned distinction
between leases and lease-equivalent short-term condominiums.
Second, separate taxation should be available to condominium units
on an all-or-nothing basis only. Where the condominium project is composed, in whole or in part, of less-than-fee property, the value of the
property could be allocated actuarily between the unit owners as a group
and the remainderman. The taxing process would be simple enough:

85.

CAL. CIV. CODE §

783.

86. Nichols, supra note 63, at 327 and n.122: "A guide to the suitable length
of the term may perhaps be found in statutes which tax leases in exempt leaseholds
only if they are longer than a three year term." E.g.,

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 273.19

(Supp. 1964).
87. National Housing Act. § 234, 75 Stat. 160, 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (Supp. 1962).
88. 24 C.F.R. § 234.55 (1965).
According to FHA,

CONDOMINIUM HOUSING INSURANCE AND SERVICING HAND-

BooK, App. V-I, § 1.6 (1962), "a leasehold will normally be permitted only in

localities where the use of leaseholds of this type is customary."
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the present value of the remainder interest, actuarily determined, would
be taxed to the remainderman, and the balance of the property value
would be taxed to the unit owners in the same fashion that the whole
would otherwise be taxed to them. s9 There are at least three reasons
why this should not be done. First, because annual calculations and adjustments would be required, this procedure would add substantially to the assessor's work load. Customarily, tax revaluations are much less frequent. Second, leases are "usually . . . ignored-included in the value
of the fee-and the lessor assessed as the owner of the property." 90 Thus,
any separate taxation of the condominium founded on a leasehold is
special treatment, which should be accorded only when necessary to
achieve the goal of unit economic independence vis-a-vis other units.9 1
Finally, given the probable length of the condominium leasehold, and
its likely renewal privilege, the remainder may well be small and, over
time, its owner or owners hard to locate. While this would have no
effect on the unit owner, it could make it virtually impossible for the
taxing entity to realize anything on the value of the remainder-in
effect, the parcel would be carved. Thus, the whole value of the condominium unit should be taxed as a parcel to the unit owner.
Under these conditions, the separate taxation of condominium units
should not be hard to effect. The analogy of the condominium unit to
the ordinary real estate parcel will answer most questions. Nonetheless,
a condominium statute should probably definitively state the actual assessment process.
Assuming that the unit owner is to be taxed on the unit's value,
which is the value of the apartment and of the inseparable percentage
of the common parts, that value must be found. Although the unit is the
taxable entity, it seems valuation should begin with a valuation of the
project or of the smallest integral division of a multi-building project.
Division of ownership should not be allowed to depress the taxable
89. See Keesling, suwpra note 61, at 482-83, where this method of allocation is
used to determine the value of a privately owned leasehold, for tax purposes, where
the publicly owned remainder is tax exempt.
90. Nichols, supra note 63, at 315.
91. Even with a general reform that required actuarial allocation of property
value between the holder of a substantial leasehold and a remainderman, there
would be good reason to refuse such treatment to the condominium founded on a
leasehold. This would require allocation at two levels: first, as between the owners
of a unit and the project remainderman, and second, among the several owners
of a condominium unit.
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value of the project2 "[Tiotal value can . . . serve as a bench mark,

against which the reasonableness of the value of the parts can be judged? ' 13
This method should solve the valuation problem peculiar to the
condominium-the valuation of the combination of an apartment and
an undivided interest in common parts. On occasion, market values will
be available for these units; then, the total value can serve its bench

mark function without more. But market values will not always be
available. And "greater uniformity and equality can be attained by
consistent application of the cost approach to value."9 4 Whether done originally or later on a reproduction basis, separate costing of the several
apartments and of the common parts would be not only most difficult,
but also extremely arbitrary. On the other hand, overall costing, on a
square or cubic foot basis can be quite reliably undertaken using available tables.99 Thus the most reliable system of unit valuation would
appear to be one directly based on overall project value.
At least two methods of direct valuation are available. The first
applies the unit owner's percentage of the common parts to the total
value to arrive at the unit's assessed valuation. The problem with this
method is that many condominium acts authorize "limited common
areas and facilities;" that is, limited common parts, which are "for the
use of certain . . . apartments to the exclusion of other apartments." 9

Even if it could be assumed that the owner's percentage of the general
common parts fairly represented his share of the total apartment value and
of the general common parts, the likely uneven distribution of the limited
parts-as, for instance, gardens for ground floor apartments only-would
destroy that rough justice.
A better solution can be based on ratios derived from the original
sales prices of the several units. Assuming that the original sales take
place in a relatively brief period, these should fairly reflect the relative
values of the units. The application of these ratios to the total value
would produce unit valuations. While adjustments in the ratios would
be necessary where there were significant changes in apartment values,
92. Cf. Gale v. Tax Commission, 17 App. Div. 2d 25, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1962).
93. RING, THE VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE 262-63 (1963), where Ring is
discussing lease appraisals.
94. Ring, Assessment Methods for Urban Real Property, 17 APPRAISAL J. 490,

493 (1949). See also Baker, For Scientific Assessment of Residential Buildings, The
American City, May 1953, p. 138.
95. Ring, Assessment Methods for UrbanReal Property,supra note 96, at 493.
96. FHA MODEL STATUTE § 2(j).
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whether as a result of internal improvement or deterioration, such adjustments should not be frequent. It is unlikely that there will be many improvements out of line with the character of the project, and great
deterioration should be forestalled by maintenance covenants. When necessary, changes in the ratios could be computed by working backwards
from the latest unit valuations as altered.
It might, however, be contended that either of these methods violates state or federal constitutional provisions. The objection, in the
absence of particular local limitations on the taxing power,9 7 is that it
is a violation of due process to derive unit value from project value where
the unit is the taxable entity. The answer at the federal level is easy:
"Neither due process nor equal protection imposes upon a state any
rigid rule of equality of taxation;"'' a reasonable method of valuation
producing reasonable results is constitutional. State constitutions should
present no greater obstacle. Validity could be insured by providing for
review of the results at the insistance of either the unit owner or other
owners in the project, and a showing of inequity in the pattern of assessments within the project should require appropriate adjustments.
With separate taxation established as a matter of principle, two
minor matters remain in the area of taxation. The first is that the
term "taxation," as it has been used here, is intended to encompass all
taxes, special assessments, and charges assessed by state and local governments.
The other matter is that of homestead exemptions. Without attempting to pass on the merits of such exemptions, it seems clear that they are
intended to encourage and to protect home ownership. Practically speaking, condominium ownership is home ownership in a new context; it deserves equal treatment. Of course, to the extent that homestead tax exemption reduces the tax liability of a unit owner and to the extent that homestead exemption law protects the unit from levy of execution, the security
of the unit owner is augmented.
B. Present Legislation
All of the states adopting condominium legislation have provided
that each condominium unit be separately assessed, taxed, and liened.
97. Cf. Finney v. Johnson, 242 Ind. 465, 179 N.E.2d 718 (1962).
98. Carmichael v. Southern Coal &Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937).
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Unfortunately, no state has used the pressure for separate taxation of
condominium units to achieve a general reform of assessment practices.
Most condominium acts declare that the unit shall be considered a
parcel. Most extend separate treatment to all types of taxes and special
assessments. The Massachusetts statute is exceptional in limiting separate
treatment to real estate taxes; °9 all other assessments may be charged
to the unit owners' organization.
All states adopting separate taxation, with the exception of California,
appear to authorize entirely separate treatment for all condominium units,
regardless of the nature of the property interest underlying the condominium holdings and its duration. California limits mandatory separate
tax treatment to condominium units held in fee simple, but the assessor
has authority to agree to treat other condominium units separately, and
the assessor's agreement is binding upon his successor.10 0
One difficulty with the present legislation is that condominiums of
virtually any duration are authorized by several states. Arizona, Hawaii,
Nevada, and Washington are examples.101 Massive short-term recompilations of tax rolls, realignments of liens, and revaluations of resulting
parcels may be required in such states. A minimum time limit on condominiums to be separately taxed should be imposed, but separate treatment of long-term leasehold condominiums should be allowed.
All statutes authorizing separate taxation for less-than-fee condominiums, with the exception of Connecticut's, present another difficulty. Connecticut alone conditions separate taxation of the unit on the unit owner's
assumption of liability for all taxes and assessments on the unit and its
proportion of the underlying fee.1 02 In the other states, it is not clear whether
an all-or-nothing principle has been adopted.
In these other states, a relatively difficult problem of statutory interpretation can be presented. There is the condominium statute, decreeing
separate taxation, which ex necessitate, rewrites a substantial portion of
the state's common and statutory law, in the tax area and elsewhere. There
will be unit owner pressure to be relieved of tax on interests not owned,
99. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183A, § 14 (Supp. 1964); where the unit
owners' organization fails, however, to discharge such collective assessments, the
resulting lien is distributed proportionately to the several units.
100. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE. § 2188.3.
101. AxR REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-551 (Supp. 1964); HAWAII REv. LAWS §§
170A-2(e), (i) (Supp. 1963); NEv. REv. STAT. § 117.010 (1963); WAsH. REv.
CoDE ANN. §§ 64.32.010(2), .030 (Supp. 1964).
102. CoN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 47-79 (Supp. 1963).
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especially where they have purchased on the unstated assumption that
they would not have to bear the full tax load. And, from a legal point
of view, in virtually every state the unit owners can assert a right to con103
tribution from other unassessed owners.
The owners' position is strengthened, and the task of interpreting
the condominium statute even more complicated where other separate
taxation legislation is encountered. In brief, the unit owner is arguing
that the unit is to be separately taxed whenever the unit is to be taxed
at all, since the condominium legislation has nothing to say about
when the unit is to be taxed. This argument, which has a superficial appeal,
certainly is aided by statutes that provide that leased property shall be taxed
to the lessor unless it is listed by the lessee;1 04 or that buildings on leased
land shall be taxed to the lessee-owner as real property where the lease
is for longer than three years. 10 Such statutes purport to divide the tax
treatment of all the less-than-fee interests described. Where the description
fairly characterizes an interest involved in the condominium situation,
exclusion of the interest from the scope of the statute will turn on the
intent to be ascribed to the usually later condominium statute, which more
often than not will have no substantial statutory history.
Because the all-or-nothing principle forestalls undue carving of the
fee, and because the present statutory ambiguity must be resolved, it is
submitted that it is a desirable principle on which to base condominium
separate taxation and it is recommended that this principle be expressly
adopted in all states authorizing less-than-fee condominium interests.
States which appear to have a particular problem in this regard are Arizona,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Oklahoma and Tennessee. Each has one or more
statutes which, taken at face value, conflict with the separate taxation
provision of the local statute if the local statute was meant to embody
the all-or-nothing principle. 10
Neither of these difficulties should, however, preclude FHA mortgage
insurance in the affected states. The FHA appears to be concerned only
103. See generally Nichols, supra note 65.
104. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 428.1 (1949).
105. E.g., IOwA CODE ANN. § 428.4 (1949); owned buildings and improvements

on leased land are taxed to the owner as personalty where the lease is for a period
of less than three years.
106. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-203, 227, 44-224 (1956); HAwAI REv. LAws
§§ 128-4, 13, 14, 14.5 (Supp. 1963); IowA CODE ANN. § 428.1, .4 (1949); MD.
ANN. CODE

(1951).

art. 81, §§ 4 (1957), 8 (Supp. 1963); OKLA.

TENN. CODE ANN.

STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 15.3

§ 67-606(5) (Supp. 1964).
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with avoiding a stack-of-cards defect that would result from project-wide
taxation, and, perhaps, with preventing deception of unit purchasers. Thus,
local legislation providing in effect for unit taxation whenever unit property
is to be taxed should satisfy the FHA. So long as a separate tax imposed
on an extra-condominium interest, such as a remainder in the land under
the entire project, is neither a liability on unit owners nor a lien affecting
their possession for the term of the property interest underlying the
condominium, the FHA has no reason to object.
Except for a relatively frequent provision that the same percentage
of the common parts ascribed to the unit owner in the declaration shall
also be assigned to him for tax purposes, the statutes have nothing to
say about the assessment process.
Homestead tax exemptions have received various treatments. Florida
gives one exemption per project to be divided among the several units.0°
Oklahoma allows the exemption to each unit where the underlying property
interest is a fee.108 It would seem that the homestead exemption should
be available to all fee and long-term condominium home units where it is
available to all single family dwellings.109

V. COMMON EXPENSES
A. Opportunity For Unit Economic Independence
With separate financing and separate taxation, the condominium unit
approaches the economic independence of the single family dwelling. Only
the common expenses of the project, the "expenses of administration,
maintenance, repair or replacement of the common areas and facilities . . .-,"1o and any other expenditures authorized by the statute, significantly fetter its independence.,
These should amount to less than
107.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § "711.19(3) (Supp. 1964).
108. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 522 (Supp. 1964).
109. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515.04(2) (Supp. 1964). It should be noted,

however, that Minnesota authorizes condominium erection on fee interests only.
110. FHA MODEL STATUTE § 2(g).
111. Two other factors that bear on the economic independence of the condominium unit, but that do not relate directly to the economic function of the
condominium are treated briefly here. It is generally assumed that "the unit owner
would have the tax advantages of any property owner to the extent he could take
deductions for federal income tax purposes for amounts paid for realty transfer
taxes, real estate taxes and interest on his mortgage and could also deduct the extent of any casualty loss which might be inflicted upon his unit. In addition, since
the unit is real property, it could be traded for other real estate on a tax free
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20 per cent of the monthly cost of housing to the unit owner. 12 To the
extent of his own share of the costs, usually determined by his percentage
ownership of the common parts, the condominium owner is less secure
than his home owning counterpart. Except insofar as the owner, with a
sufficient number of other owners, can control the decision of the owners'
association and thus prevent the authorization of expenditure, he cannot
postpone or avoid liability for any of the common expenses. 1 The unit
owner is likewise less secure than his home owning counterpart to the
full extent of the common expenses of the project. If another owner defaults,
and the default is not cured either by enforcement of payment or by the
liquidation of a security interest, usually the defaulting owner's interest in his
114
unit, the unit owner is liable for the resulting additional common expense.
Therefore a limited stack-of-cards defect is built into the condominium
project.
The FHA has taken one step to limit the potential of this defect.
"Commitments for insurance issued under Section 234 are conditioned
upon . . . sale to FHA-approved purchasers of units amounting to 80

per cent of the value of all units."- 5 FHA Regulations provide that a
"mortgagor must have a general credit standing satisfactory to the
Commissioner. ' ""0 Thus the FHA is attempting to insure project stability
by credit checking of the unit purchasers. The efficacy of this effort,
however, must be dubious where three per cent down payment purchasers
are contemplated ." 7 Although they may be good credit risks, if the economy
basis." Smith, Condominium in Pennsylvania, Prrr. L.J., Jan. 1964, p. 6. There

is no reason to doubt the validity of this assumption. See also Karchmer, Missouri
Condominium Property Act of 1963, 29 Mo. L. REV. 238, 246 (1964).
On the other hand, without more, it fairly can be assumed that the unit owner,

as a tenant in common of the common parts of the project, will be a joint or vicarious tort feasor and jointly and severally liable with the other owners to anyone tortiously injured by the condition or operation of the common parts. Liabil-

ity insurance, carried as a common expense, is the ready answer to this problem.
Another answer more attractive to the unit owner is limited liability-limited perhaps to the value of the owner's unit. The choice is not easy, but it is submitted
that owner responsibility should be limited in favor of owner security.

112. Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?

L. REv. 298, at 323 n.184.
113. See FHA MODEL STATUTE § 21, which is typical: "No apartment owner
may exempt himself from liability for his contribution towards the common expenses by waiver of the use or enjoyment of any of the common areas or facilities
or by abandonment of his apartment."
114. See FHA MODEL STATUTE § 23(b), which is typical in this regard.
115. FHA, FACT SHF T, FHA MORTGAGE INSURANCE ON CONDOMINIUM 2
(1963); 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(c)(3) (1965).
116. 24 C.F.R. § 203.34 (1965).
117. 24 C.F.R. § 203.19 (1965).
50
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should falter, some-perhaps many-of these people, with their limited
financial backing, will not be able to meet their obligations.
In order to limit the loss caused by an owner's default, it is desirable
that the common expense assessments, for which the owner is personally
liable, be lienable against the defaulting owner's unit."8 The event giving
notice of the lien to third parties probably should be the formal assessment
of the common expense to the unit owner. It could be objected, however,
that no lien affecting the rights of third parties should arise until a public
recording gives notice of its existence. The choice is a close one because
with the formal assessment, there will be a record at the office of the
condominium project, and most persons who would benefit from a public
recording will also be persons who would know enough to check the project
records. In either case, the appropriate officer of the owners' association
should be required to disclose such liens on request.
A lien, by definition, is a right to be paid from the value of the
property on which it is imposed, unless that value is exhausted in paying
a prior lien. Its validity being established, the crucial issue with reference
to any lien is its relative priority. Tax liens, mortgage liens, and mechanics'
liens, to name only the most obvious, will be competing with the common
expense lien for payment from the value of the defaulting owner's unit.
It is within the power of the state to determine, at least for future liens,
the order in which these liens shall be paid."1° Thus, the relative priority
of the common expense lien must be determined as a matter of policy,
with attention to its purpose and to the purposes of the several competing
liens.
At least two kinds of liens appear to have higher claims to recognition
than the common expense lien. The first is the lien for unpaid state or
local real property taxes. Usually this lien has a first priority without
regard to the time at which it arises. 20 In this way the revenues of the
taxing government are preserved.
118. See FHA MODEL STATUTE § 23 (a).
119. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, the contracts clause, has been interpreted to
prevent retroactive modification of state lien law, except in exceptional circumstances. Cf. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Unless specifically invalidated as a result of the application of one of the
trustee in bankruptcy's avoiding powers, state liens are valid in -bankruptcy; 3,
COLLIER, BANKauPTcY § 64.02 (14th ed. 1941).
120. This assertion is subject to the qualification that federal tax liens imposed
under ITr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, will take precedence at least where prior in
time.
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The second lien is the purchase money mortgage securing the advance
that makes possible the purchase of the condominium unit. To encourage
relatively easy credit and home ownership, the purchase money lender
should be subjected to as few risks as is feasible. 121 There is, however, no
reason why other liens, merely preceding in time the common expense
lien, should be similarly benefited. Indeed, it can be maintained that a
third priority for the common expense lien will actually benefit other
lienors as a group insofar as it eliminates the stack-of-cards defect remaining in the condominium. One other lien that might be accorded
priority over the common expense lien is the laborers' and materialmen's
lien. The argument for elevating this lien is that it was designed to protect
individuals and small businesses, any one of whom would be seriously injured
by a default on its lien, unlike the institutional lienors for whom benefit as
a group is a more meaningful concept. Of course, the laborers' and materialmen's liens also operate to favor substantial businesses in the building
industry. Unless such businesses are to be distinguished, the choice between
unit owners and laborers and materialmen is another hard one.
The major difficulty with a lien system such as the one outlined in
the preceding paragraph is that it provides continued protection to nondiligent parties. Assume a condominium unit that originally sold for $10,000,
with an outstanding purchase money mortgage of $9,000. Assume further
that the market value of the unit has declined to $8,500. At this point,
the owner defaults on a monthly assessment of, say, no more than $50.
A lien for this amount arises in favor of the owners' association. Assuming
the owner is judgment proof, the association faces a dilemma: if it does
not foreclose the lien, the owner is likely to default on later assessments;
on the other hand, it is more unlikely that the unit, now subject to the
prior lien, can be sold. In this situation, most owners' associations will not
be aided by the opportunity to bid at the sale. If a stack-of-cards acceleration of defaults is to be avoided the lender must be forced to clear
122
the property.
The lender should be given the alternatives of selling to clear the
property or of being subordinated pro tanto to the common expense liens

121. Cf.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

9-312(3).

122, Similar situations will be frequent. Each defaulted assessment will be
small, hardly worth suing for, and certainly not worth a mortgage foreclosure regardless of the value of the condominium unit. Yet, as these unpaid assessments
accumulate, they pose an increasing threat to the unit owners. The liens may well
eat up the unit owner's equity before his neighbors can bring themselves to foreclose.
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on it. 23 The lender should not be subordinated until notice of default has
been given; he should be subordinated only to subsequent defaults, and
then only if he fails to clear the property in a reasonable time-for instance,
90 days. He should be subordinated to new liens for a limited period,
probably 90 days, unless he is notified of further default before the
expiration of such period.

The risk thus incurred is somewhat similar to the danger of the lender's
being subordinated to liens for unpaid taxes.1 24 In both cases, it is submitted that the lender is in the best position to determine whether or not
the property should be transferred to a more able user. Also, the lender
has the capacity to protect the non-defaulting individual owners and the
predominately local property tax revenues, either by adding the cost of
this service to its mortgage charges or channeling these losses back into
the broader public sector represented by FHA mortgage insurance.
While it would enhance unit owner security to make similar provisions
regarding state and local tax liens, this is not recommended. These lienors
are not likely to have either the organization necessary to assess owner
responsibility on a continuing basis or the capacity for diligence possessed
by a commercial lender. They too will face the problem of small and accumulating liens, and thus, the want of a paramount interest in obtaining
a financially able user for the property liened. Finally, the problems in
this area are likely to be greatest at times when property tax revenues
are already under great pressure, and a new and unlikely institution would
be necessary to spread the resulting losses.
There remains the two-pronged problem of what happens to the
common expense lien and the unpaid common expenses when the liened
unit is sold, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. The determination that
each unit "shall for all purposes constitute real property . . ." should

determine the treatment of the lien.125 No reason appears for varying
generally obtaining principles concerning real property liens. Thus, a
grantee who takes a voluntary conveyance should take subject to outstanding
liens of which he has actual or constructive notice, including, of course,
123. Cf. ILL.

ANN. STAT.

ch. 30, § 309 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964), which sub-

ordinates prior recorded encumbrances to common expense liens arising in the 90

day period following notice to the encumbrancer of a default by the unit owner.
124. It can fairly be assumed that all institutional lenders will protect themselves from accumulating tax liens by providing that liability on their secured
indebtedness will be accelerated, at their option, in the event of the unit owner's
default in payment of tax assessments.

125. FHA

MODEL STATUTE § 4.
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a common expense lien. 26 On the other hand, a grantee purchasing at
either a tax or mortgage foreclosure sale should take free of subordinate
liens127 Subordinate lienors must be relegated to intervention to obtain
the benefit of any surplus realized on the foreclosure sale, since any other
result would effectively subordinate the tax and prior mortgage liens to
the common expense lien.
When, however, it becomes apparent that a common expense assessment is uncollectible, or at best will be collected only catch-as-catch-can
from the prior unit owner, this expense will have to be borne by the
other unit owners. If it is assessed to these owners before there is a foreclosure successor, the liability should not be shifted, even in part, to the
successor. The prior lien should not be indirectly subordinated. On the
other hand, when the common expense arrears are reassessed after there
is a foreclosure successor, it seems fair that he share this expense as
he would any other contemporaneous common expense.1 28 To a certain
extent this future common expense potential does work a subordination
of the prior liens by depressing the sale value of the unit. This effect should
be minimal where only a small fraction of the units in a project are in
default, because the defaulted assessment will be spread over all units.
Where a large number of units are in default, the sale value will be
substantially depressed; but this depression, being a cost of spreading
existing owner defaults and thus avoiding further owner defaults, is the
price of project stability that benefits both lienors and owners.
Thus limited by owner screening when the FHA is involved (as it
predictably will be in any moderate income housing development) and
by the advocated lien law, the common expense stack-of-cards defect of
the condominium should not be unduly hazardous to the unit owner.
This conclusion depends, however, on adequate definition of common
expenses. In brief, while it is perfectly reasonable that a simple majority
or a working majority of a quorum of an owners' association should be
able to assess the expenses of administration, maintenance, and incidental
replacement, that same simple majority should not be empowered either
to undertake substantial project improvements or substantial postdestruction rebuilding. Clear division will not be possible, but the concept
126. B.g., FHA MODEL STATUTE § 24.
127. E.g., FHA MODEL STATUTE § 23(b), concerning superior mortgages. The
model statute is curiously silent concerning purchasers at tax sales.

128. Cf. FHA

MODEL STATUTE

§ 23(b).
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is readily expressed: ordinary and necessary expenses of project upkeep
should be assessable.129
It should be possible, on the other hand, to make assessments for
extraordinary expenditures although there is less than unanimous owner
support. The easiest case is that where sufficient insurance proceeds are
available to finance rebuilding of destroyed units. Here, it seems, an
absolute majority should be controlling; less than a majority should not
be able to renege on their commitment to the group where their only
added expense will be interim living expense. From this case on, the
appropriate statutory provision becomes a matter of balancing. The following arrangement seems to be a good one: where the additional expense
will be less than 20 per cent greater than the insurance proceeds, two-thirds
of the unit owners should be able to determine to rebuild and to bind
the other owners; where, however, the additional expense is greater than
20 per cent, while two-thirds of the owners should be able to determine
to rebuild, they should be required to elect either to undertake the additional expense or to buy out the dissenters at the fair market value of
their respective interests in the insurance proceeds, land, and remains.
The problem posed by less than unanimous desire for improvements
is similar to that raised by destruction where the insurance proceeds
are inadequate. 180 Again, it would seem that two-thirds of the unit owners
should be able to determine to improve. It would seem also that these
assenting owners should either underwrite the expense or buy out the
dissenters when the costs of improvements are substantial-say greater
than 10 per cent of the pre-improvement unit value. It is believed that
this percentage should be set lower than that on the destruction contingency for two reasons. First, there is a self-insurance factor working in
the destruction setting. Insurance proceeds are intentionally likely to be
less than pre-destruction unit values. Nonetheless insurance proceeds do
seem to be an appropriate measure of individual capacity to tolerate
additional expense. Second, resistance to improvement expenditures generally deserves greater respect in that the dissenting owners can assert
reliance on the original concept of the project.
129.

Cf.

Irr. REV. CoDE OF 1954,

§ 162.

130. Cf. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 183A, § 18 (Supp. 1964), which provides
that, where 50-75% of the unit owners wish improvements, they may undertake
them at their own expense; but that, where more than 75% desire the improvements, all unit owners must pay their share. If, however, the cost of the improvements to a dissenting unit owner in the latter case exceeds 10% of the value of
the unit before the improvements, the dissenter is given appraisal rights.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

29

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. :30

There is at least one other significant opportunity for unit economic
independence inherent in the condominium concept. This is the opportunity
for separate insurability. A condominium unit represents a substantial
interest in specific property; a contract to indemnify the unit owner against
its loss hardly could be found a mere wager policy. Moreover, separate
insurability should follow implicitly from the declaration that the unit
is real property.1 3' This would allow the individual unit owner to protect
32
himself from major loss.
It should be noted, however, that the FHA requires blanket project
insurance, with the costs assessed to the unit owners as common expenses. 13 And this would seem to be the necessary approach, particularly
if significant reconstruction provisions are to turn on the amount of the
insurance proceeds. Every unit, both because it is in part composed of
common parts and because of the close physical relationship of the apartments, must be insured in order to protect every other unit owner. Here
again, the significance of the provisions enabling the collection of common
expense assessments is demonstrated; defaults of insurance premiums
3
on which every unit owner is relying cannot be permitted.s'
B. Present Legislation
The present statutes do not adequately define the scope of the
common expense concept. Many, in following the FHA Model Statute,
do not limit these expenses to administration, maintenance and repair
or replacement, but include expenses "agreed upon as common expenses
by the Association of Apartment Owners." (Emphasis added.) 33 The
term "agreement" is ambiguous. Either unit owner security is radically
impaired because the vote of a simple or working majority or majority in
interest is association agreement and can authorize any expenditure, or unit
owner flexibility is radically impaired because there is no provision for
131. See text, supra at 11.
132. Smith, supra note 114, at 5,observes that one aspect of the "heart rending" tale of the cooperative owner in the thirties was uninsured loss on account
of unpaid corporate insurance premiums.
133. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(b) (1965).
134. FHA MODEL STATUTE, COMMENTARY ON MODEL STATUTE FOR CREATION OF
APARTMEivNT OWNERSHIP 3, observes that the FHA requirement of project-wide insurance is intended to be without prejudice to the right of the owner to carry additional insurance. It does, however, seem that individual insurance will be infrequent where there is project insurance.
135. FHA MODEL STATUTE § 2(g)(3).
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less than unanimous determination to make expensive, fundamental changes
in the project.
Massachusetts alone has specific provisions for project improvements.
A high vote requirement protects dissenting owners from the imposition
of unwanted expenses; appraisal rights are given to the dissenters if their
share of the resulting common expenses exceeds 10 per cent of the
pre-improvement value of their unit, but fundamental changes can be
authorized with less than unanimous owner support." 6 California takes
another approach, permitting reasonable assessments as common expenses. 1 37 Inferentially, this approach appears to authorize common expenditures for ordinary upkeep and for improvements as long as these
are reasonable in amount and probably in purpose as well. The concept
is likely to be a difficult one to apply. Massachusetts appears to have the
better approach.
Almost all of the statutes have destruction-rebuilding provisions.
Most simply provide that, in the event of destruction, and in the event
that the owners' association does not decide within a certain period to rebuild,
then the condominium shall terminate and the owners shall be tenants
in common of the land and ruins. 18s Only West Virginia faces the problem
posed by the possible imposition of high rebuilding costs on unwilling
owners. Its statute provides that the owners in the area "directly affected"
are to bear the burden of reconstruction costs, but that 75 per cent of
these owners can determine not to rebuild' 8 9 The statute does give those
affected a say, and it does set up the desirable presumption that rebuilding should take place. But it seems to assume that the condominium project
will always be severable. Where the project is not technically, economically,
and aesthetically severable, the statute may allow a minority to
renege on their commitment to the majority to rebuild, since realistically
all units are "directly affected," yet owners of only 75 per cent of the physically damaged units (possibly a minority of all unit owners) might well be
permitted to decide not to rebuild. Again, a better approach to the problem
would appear to be along the lines of the Massachusetts improvement provision, with the costs of rebuilding being spread to all owners after a high vote
determination to rebuild, and with appraisal rights for dissenters if the cost
136. MASS.

GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 183A, § 18 (Supp. 1964).

137. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1355.
138. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515.26 (Supp. 1964).
139. W.VA. CODE ANN. § 3581(72) (Supp. 1965).
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of rebuilding is substantially in excess of either insurance proceeds or
pre-destruction unit value.
With few exceptions, common expenses assessments are made liens
on the unit assessed, either at the time of assessment" 0 or, more frequently,
when a notice of delinquency in payment is recorded.4 Pennsylvania,
surprisingly, specifically negates lien treatment; it requires that the common expense be prosecuted to judgment as any other debt of the unit
owner. 42 Several of the shorter acts are silent in this regard." 3 Several avoid
calling their provision that the common expenses shall be paid first on sale or
conveyance (subject to specific exceptions) a lien.'" This provision creates a priority that closely approximates the function of a lien. The danger
in this approach is that with several of the attributes of the traditional
fien missing, including, significantly, foreclosure initiative, there is a possibility that the provision will be deemed to create only an insolvency
priority, ineffective in bankruptcy proceedings.'" Because the issue is close,
the clear expression of an intent to effect a lien might be determinative,
and it should be expressed in future legislation.
Generally, tax liens and mortgage liens are superior to the common
expense lien. Only Puerto Rico limits the superiority of the tax lien,
subordinating its common expense preference only to the last three years'
taxes. 46 The states appear to be about evenly divided between those sub7
ordinating the common expense lien to all prior recorded mortgages"1
48
and those subordinating the former lien to first mortgages only. The
latter approach is preferable. A first mortgage is probably a purchase
money mortgage, so the property, as security, is first applied for the
benefit of those debts arising directly from the use of the property, including the common expenses. Oklahoma and North Carolina are exceptional in interposing one or more other liens before the common expense
140. E.g., WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.32.200 (Supp. 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 230.92 (Supp. 1965).
141. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.18 (Baldwin 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 34-36-25 (Supp. 1964).
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 700.703 (Supp. 1964).
143. E.g., S.D. Laws 1963, ch. 293.
144. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-488 (Supp. 1964); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1301a, § 18 (Supp. 1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.15 (Supp. 1964).
145. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUircY § 64.02 (14th ed. 1941).
146. P.R. LAWS

ANN.

tit. 31, § 1293(d) (Supp. 1964).

147. E.g., § 448.080 RSMo 1964 Supp.
148. E.g., Kan. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 329, § 23.
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liens.14" Nevada simply applies a first-in-time principle.15°
Illinois stands alone in promoting diligence among mortgagees as a
condition to continued superiority over common expense liens. It provides
that, on notice of a unit owner's delinquency with respect to a common
expense assessment, prior encumbrances are subordinated to expenses
becoming due in the succeeding 90 days.15 ' It is submitted that this is good
law. The Puerto Rico provision, limiting the superiority of tax liens
5 2
relative to common expense liens, has the same commendable intent.
It is less clear, however, that diligence can reasonably be required of state
and local governments.
The greatest difficulty with present legislation has been encountered
in the disposition of the unpaid common expenses and related liens following a conveyance of the unit. On the one hand, there are the relatively
early statutes, such as those in Arkansas and Louisiana, which make any
purchaser of the unit liable for unpaid common expense assessments.' 8
These provisions effectively subvert the statutory declaration that tax
liens and certain mortgagees have lien priority; a purchaser at a foreclosure
sale will discount his bid to take account of his acquired common expense
liability. On the other hand, there are the many relatively satisfactory
statutes that follow the FHA Model Statute. These impose the outstanding common expense liability only on voluntary purchasers from the unit
owner; purchasers at mortgage foreclosure sales take free of the unpaid
common expenses, except as the failure to collect the prior assessment
necessitates a re-distribution of the expense over all unit owners, including
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale."54 This is an informed approach to
the problem of balancing the integrity of the lienor's security interest
against the desire to avert a stack-of-cards defect in the condominium
project. The flaw is in the failure to provide for disposition of the unpaid
common expenses in the event of a tax foreclosure sale. It would seem
that the purchaser here should receive the same treatment as the purchaser

149. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 523 (Supp. 1964), judgment liens prior in
time and mechanics' liens; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-22(3) (Supp. 1963), mechanics'
liens.
150. NEv. REv. STAT. § 117.070(2) (1963).
151. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 309 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964).
152. Supra note 149.
153. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1019 (Supp. 1963); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1139
(1965).
154. E.g., Alaska Laws 1963, ch. 44, § 1; Kan. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 329, §§ 23,
24.
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at the mortgage foreclosure sale; Pennsylvania so provides 3 The Pennsylvania statute does not, however, provide for the re-distribution of unpaid common expenses over the entire owners' group, including the foreclosure purchaser. It is possible that this provision may be implied in
that it is fair to characterize the re-distribution simply as the distribution
of a present expense. The statutes should be clarified.
VI. CONCLUSION

The condominium is a significant innovation in the real property
field. Its promise is that it can provide home ownership, with its economic
and psychological advantages, in areas where the single family dwelling
has become economically, if not physically, impossible. It is this promise
that justifies the carving of the real estate parcel to provide separate
taxation for the condominium unit and that amply compensates for the
other necessary modifications of the law of property and liens.

155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 700.705 (Supp. 1964).
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CONDOMINIUM STATUTES

Ala. Acts 1964, No. 206.*
Alaska Laws 1963, ch. 44.
Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-551 to -561 (Supp. 1964).
ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1001 to -1023 (Supp. 1963).
CAL. Cry. CODE §§ 1350-59.
Colo. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 223.
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 46"67 to -88 (Supp. 1964).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 §§ 2201-41 (Supp. 1964).*
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-901 to -933 (Supp. 1965).'
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 711.01-23 (Supp. 1964).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1601b to -1625b (Supp. 1963).
HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 170A-1 to -33 (Supp. 1963).
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 55-1501 to -1527 (Supp. 1965).'
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 211-31 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964).
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-4201 to -1231 (Supp. 1965).
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 499B.1-.16 (Supp. 1964).
Kan. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 329.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.805-.990 (Baldwin 1963).
LA.RV.STAT.ANN. §§ 9:1121-42 (1965).
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 357, §§ 560-87 (Supp. 1965).'
MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 117A-142 (Supp. 1964).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183A, §§ 1-19 (Supp. 1964).
MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.50 (Supp. 1963).
MimN. STAT. ANN. §§ 515.01-.29 (Supp. 1964).
MIss. CoDE ANN. §§ 896-01 to -21 (Supp. 1964).*
§§ 448.010-.220 RSMo 1964 Supp.
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-801 to -823 (Supp. 1963).'
N~r. REv. STAT. §§ 117.010-.120 (1963).
N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 46A-1 to -28 (Supp. 1964).*
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-4-1 to -28 (Supp. 1965).
N.Y. REAL PROP. §§ 339d-ii.*
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47A-1 to -28 (Supp. 1963).
N.D. REv. CODE §§ 47-04.1-01 to -13 (Supp. 1965).'
OHIo REv. CODE: ANN. §§ 5311.01-.22 (Baldwin 1964).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 501-30 (Supp. 1964).
ORa. REv. STAT. §§ 91.505-.675 (1963).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 700.101-.805 (Supp. 1964).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1291-93k (Supp. 1964).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-36-1 to -36 (Supp. 1964).
S.C. CODE ANN.. §§ 57-471 to -493 (Supp. 1964).
S.D. Laws 1963, ch. 293.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2701 to -2722 (Supp. 1964).
TEx. REv. Ci. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, §§ 1-25 (Supp. 1964).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-8-1 to -35 (Supp. 1965).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.1-.33 (Supp. 1964).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 64.32.010-.920 (Supp. 1964).
W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3581(34)-(73) (Supp. 1965).
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.70.97 (Supp. 1965).
Wyo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 59.'
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